The AG Settlement:
Short on Time and Money,
Long on Loopholes

Produced by the Tobacco Control Resource Center, 11/18/98

Contents:
I. Tobacco Advertising Limits are a Mirage
II. Money Left on the Table
III. State, Local, and Public Health Claims Precluded
IV. Bogus State and Local Lobbying Restrictions
V. Equitable (Non-Monetary) Relief
VI. Youth Access Provisions in the Master State Settlement
VII. Conclusion

The multi-state agreement is no ordinary civil settlement. The proposed settlement’s scope is broad and its ramifications far-reaching. Critical issues of public health will be significantly affected by the settlement’s complex provisions. Given the proposed settlement’s broad and very public impact, the process chosen is deeply disturbing. The short time frame given to the Attorneys General to consent or decline participation makes impossible a full and open public debate about the complex, life and death issues at stake. Citizens are given no ability to learn about the settlement’s details, to consider its implications, and to make their opinion known to their elected representatives. Democracy demands that matters of such importance should be debated openly and freely. The health of our nation’s youth should not be determined in closed, smoke-filled rooms!

This analysis is necessarily brief due to the extremely short time allowed for review. The public has been given less than four days to examine a densely packed 150 page legal document that will heavily influence national health policy for at least the next twenty-five years. It is no surprise that the settlement agreement is laced with loopholes considering the co-authors of the document include the tobacco industry and its attorneys.

 I. Tobacco Advertising Limits Are A Mirage

By Robert Kline

The multi-state agreement between the tobacco companies and the state attorneys general touts as one of its great achievements the restriction of tobacco industry advertising. But upon a brief review of the document the alleged advantages disappear as a mirage - attractive when first seen in the distance, but lacking substance when one looks closer. Any restriction on the industry achieved in one paragraph is undercut in a subsequent paragraph.

• Youth Targeting - The industry may not "take any action the primary purpose of which is to initiate, maintain or increase the incidence of Youth smoking within any Settling State." Section III(a) This allows the industry to continue to market to kids if that is only one of several purposes of the advertising. This is already illegal under Fair Advertising laws and prohibited by the industry’s own code of conduct.

• Use of Cartoons - The ban on the use of cartoon characters allows the Marlboro Man and other successful advertising campaigns to continue. This is a step back from the more comprehensive June 20, 1997 agreement that also banned human and animal images. The settlement also allows continued use of cartoon and animal depictions currently in use on corporate logos and packaging that then may be used in other advertising. See Section II(l)

• Brand Name Sponsorships - Restricting sponsorships is very important because that is where the tobacco industry has shifted the bulk of its promotional dollars. A Participating Manufacturer may not sponsor "events in which the intended audience is comprised of a significant youth audience". Section III(c)(1) What percent of an audience need be identified as "youth" for the restriction to apply? Is the manufacturer excused if the manufacturer "intends" the event to be for an adult audience, but a significant proportion of the audience is youth? Does this clause cover auto racing where there is a significant proportion of youth audience, or is NASCAR racing exempt based on the definition of "Brand Name Sponsorship" (Section IIj)?

• "Limited" Brand Name Sponsorships - The industry is given three more years of unlimited sponsorships before this provision takes effect, assuming current contracts run for three years or more. Section III(c)(2). It is important to note that the limitations on Brand Name Sponsorships do not apply to so-called adult-only facilities. Section IIG

• Outdoor Advertising and Transit Advertising - The definition section states "Outdoor advertising" does not mean posters on the inside or outside of retail stores. (including video arcades!) This is where a large percent of advertising dollars of the industry is now directed. Sections II(ii) and III (d)

• The settlement allows an unlimited number of signs 14 square feet or less anywhere on the property of anyone who sells tobacco products. The industry can use all the same advertising tricks by merely changing the shape and size of the signs. These signs will likely be at eye level and particularly densely packed in urban areas where there are high concentrations of tobacco retailers.

• The ‘prohibition" of tobacco billboards does not apply to outdoor advertising for Brand Name Sponsorships. Thus, for example, RJ Reynolds can litter the outdoor advertising industry with billboards promoting Winston cigarettes through the Winston Cup series. Section III (c)(2)(E)

• Payments Related to Tobacco Product and Media - The industry would probably ratify the agreement with just the original eight states signing on, therefore the product placement agreement will have a national impact on movies and television. Other attorneys general need not sign on to get the benefit. Section III(e)

• Sale of Merchandise With Tobacco Brand Names - This apparent restriction has a specific exception for merchandise used in brand name sponsored events. Section III (c)(2)(D). Merchandise will still be produced and in circulation.

• Third Party Use of Brand Names - This section exempts current contracts in existence as of July 1, 1998. If these are long term contracts this restriction will be meaningless and may actually give the industry cover to continue this behavior. Furthermore, this provision allows any merchandise presently in the hands of third parties to continue to be distributed. It is unclear how much gear has already been transferred to distributors in anticipation of this deal. Section III(i)

 II. Money Left On the Table

By Mark Gottlieb

• Back-Loaded vs. Front-Loaded - The payments to states under the Agreement are "back-loaded." In the year 2000, the industry would pay half of what it would in 2018, even taking inflation into account. Smaller payments in the early years would minimize the financial impact on the tobacco companies and avoid immediate price increases that would tend to reduce consumption and make tobacco products less affordable for kids. This layaway plan for the industry's payments would appear to create a partnership between the industry and settling states to assure payments in later years.

• Less Money in the Event of Bankruptcy - Were the companies to suffer major legal defeats in other pending or future lawsuits and be required to pay lump sum damages in the range of billions of dollars, a Manufacturer could declare bankruptcy under Chapter 11. If it does, then those larger payments placed in the later years of the agreement might never materialize. Because only the tobacco manufacturing divisions and not the parent corporations are liable under the Agreement, such a result would mean that the states have given up all future claims for far less than they had bargained for. This is particularly true if tobacco divisions of the parent companies are split off, as BAT has just done and RJR is expected to do.

• The Wrong Inflation Rate - The payments are tied to the consumer price index, not the medical care inflation rate. However, the costs that the state must pay are medical care costs. The Agreement relies on the wrong inflation rate. If the costs of treating sick Medicaid patients continues to increase as it has in recent years, the state's hands will be tied because the Agreement releases future claims against the industry forever. This leaves our children, as taxpayers, to pay those medical expenses. If the state were to go into court every few years to collect what the industry owes them, then there is a better chance to collect actual future damages then the Agreement provides.

• Less Money Than Minnesota - In its settlement with Minnesota, and through the "Most Favored Nation" clauses of the previous three settlements (MS, FL, TX) the states received significantly more money than is provided for in the multi-state Agreement. Based on a rough projection of the settlement dollars in relation to estimated smoking-attributed Medicaid costs Minnesota obtained by pushing the industry in court, the multi-state agreement appears to provide only about 54% of that level of funding. This marks a step back from the benchmark set in Minnesota. By increasing the industry's payment levels to the point where an immediate price increase would be necessary, it would be possible fund the states at the Minnesota level or better, and have an impact on smoking rates and youth smoking attributable to the price increase.

• Wall Street Journal Likes the Deal - For the public health community, criticism of tobacco industry initiatives such as the multi-state Agreement is nothing new. But even the Wall Street Journal has found the Agreement to be "a far better deal for cigarette makers than widely expected." The Journal also noted that, "[a]nalysts largely found the terms more favorable to the industry then they anticipated." (Is Tobacco Settlement Good News for Firms? WSJ 11/17/98).
  

• Divide and Conquer- The tobacco industry has also created a divide and conquer strategy both within the public health community and between the states and federal government. First, the agreement designates that money should be used for tobacco control or substance abuse prevention. This will create an ugly and distracting battle for the spoils between tobacco control and prevention programs and substance abuse treatment and prevention programs. Also, the Agreement is structured so that a federal tobacco excise tax increase will reduce the industry's payments to the states, effectively putting states in the strange position of opposing a federal tobacco tax increase, normally the job of the tobacco industry.

 III. State, Local and Public Claims Precluded

By Professor Peter Enrich

• The settlement appears to severely restrict the ability of states, localities, other subdivisions of state governments, and others acting in furtherance of the public interest to bring a wide range of legal actions against a wide range of parties (including retailers and distributors of tobacco products). These restrictions could severely hamper a wide range of tobacco control efforts, directed at both past and future conduct.
  

• The States - The restriction on any future monetary claims "directly or indirectly based on, arising out of or in any way related to, in whole or in part, the use of or exposure to Tobacco Products manufactured in the ordinary course of business" is troublingly broad. This restriction means that the proposed monetary recovery must reflect all future state tobacco-related health costs (not only the past costs for which the settled suits typically seek recovery), because no future recoveries of such costs will be possible.
  

• The restriction would appear to severely limit future state actions to enforce a wide array of tobacco control measures by seeking monetary damages from tobacco companies, retailers, or other agents or associates of the tobacco companies. For example, a state action for civil damages for a retailer’s or distributor’s violation of a state law restriction on marketing or advertising practices would appear to be barred.
  

• Local Government - The settlement also extends those same restrictions to cities, counties, and other political entities that are not parties to the settlement. the authority of the states to release such claims of entities that are not parties to the settlement is unclear, and will raise difficult issues inviting state-by-state adjudication. Section II(pp) To the extent that these third-party releases are enforceable, the effect both on pending local enforcement actions and on future local tobacco control efforts may be severe.
  

• States Pitted Against Local Government - Worse, even where the third-party releases may be found unenforceable, the settlement provides that any monetary damages for which the tobacco companies may be found liable in such local government suits will reduce, dollar-for-dollar, the state’s recoveries under the settlement. Section XII(b). This gives the states a direct incentive to try to enforce their release of local governments’ rights, and the settlement expressly reserves the right of the states to intervene in such actions to assert that interest (see XII(b)(2)(C)). These provisions have the likely effect of turning the states into agents of the tobacco companies in efforts to prevent local governments from pursuing tobacco control enforcement actions.

IV. Bogus State and Local Lobbying Restrictions

By Graham Kelder

• Historically, the greatest deterrents to local and statewide tobacco control efforts have been 1) tobacco industry legal intimidation; 2) tobacco industry opposition to local and statewide initiatives through lobbying, and/or the activity of astro-turf roots groups (like the National Smokers Alliance) and/or tobacco industry proxies (like the New England Convenience Store Association or the Massachusetts Restaurant Association); 3)lack of resources; and 4) lack of policy guidance.
  

• The summary of the multi-state settlement states that the Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) achieves the following:
  

• "Tobacco companies prohibited from opposing proposed state or local laws or administrative rules which are intended to limit youth access to and consumption of tobacco products."
  

• "Prohibits lobbyists from supporting or opposing state, federal, or local laws or actions without authorization of the companies."

• Section III m (1) of the MSA states that that the Exhibit F limitations on lobbying (which will be discussed below)

…[do] not prohibit any participating Manufacturer from (A) challenging enforcement of, or suing for declaratory or injunctive relief with respect to, any such legislation or rule on any grounds; (B) continuing…to oppose or cause to be opposed…any specific state or local legislative proposals or administrative rules introduced prior to the time of State-Specific Finality in such Settling State; (C) opposing, or causing to be opposed, any excise or income tax provision or user fee or other payments relating to Tobacco Products or Tobacco Product Manufacturers; or (D) opposing, or causing to be opposed, any state or local legislative proposal or administrative rule that also includes measures other than those described in Exhibit F.

• So, in addition to the Exhibit F loopholes enumerated below, the tobacco industry is specifically granted permission by the MSA to:
  

• Seek declaratory or injunctive relief with respect to, any such legislation or rule on any grounds. So, jurisdictions can pass legislation or a rule, but the tobacco industry can immediately haul them into court to enjoin having this legislation or rule from taking effect and becoming actual law. This is one of the classic forms of tobacco industry legal intimidation. This renders all of the concessions given in Exhibit F completely insignificant.
  

• Continue to oppose, or cause to be opposed, the enforcement of any legislation or rule. This renders all of the concessions given in Exhibit F completely insignificant. Forbidding the tobacco industry to oppose the passage of a law while allowing them to oppose the enforcement of that law is absurd!
  

• Continue to oppose, or cause to be opposed, any legislative proposals or rules introduced prior to State-Specific Finality. State-Specific Finality does not occur until 1) the MSA and Consent Decree have been approved by the Court as to all Original Participating Manufacturers (or until all appeals are exhausted); 2) all claims have been released as provided by the MSA; and 3) the time for appeal or to seek review of or permission to appeal from the approval or entry of the MSA has expired. (Section II ss). State-Specific Finality may not occur until some time in the distant future.
  

• Continue to oppose, or cause to be opposed, "any excise or income tax provision or user fee or other payments relating to Tobacco Products or Tobacco Product Manufacturers." This would leave the industry free to oppose two of the most significant provisions a state could pass:
  

• A further excise tax on tobacco products; and

• A statewide look-back law (a payment relating to Tobacco Products and Tobacco Product Manufacturers).

• Continue to oppose, or cause to be opposed any state or local measure "that also includes measures other than those described in Exhibit F." So, combine any of the mostly insignificant items in Exhibit F with anything else and the tobacco industry is specifically sanctioned to be free to oppose you by the MSA.

• The MSA states (in section III m (1), p. 29 of official bound copy):

(1) No participating Manufacturer may oppose, or cause to be opposed (including through any third party or Affiliate), the passage by such Settling State (or any political subdivision thereof) of those state or local legislative proposals or administrative rules described in Exhibit F hereto intended by their terms to reduce Youth access to, and the incidence of Youth consumption of, Tobacco Products. (Emphasis supplied.)

• See Exhibit F ("Potential Legislation Not To Be Opposed).

Analysis of Exhibit F Restrictions

• The tobacco industry remains free to oppose any and all restrictions on exposure to environmental tobacco smoke.
  

• F1 (No opposition to vending machine restrictions):
  

• This is a significant concession for those jurisdictions that do not yet have restrictions on vending machines.

• A large portion of Massachusetts cities and towns (180 cities and towns = 77% of the Massachusetts population) already restrict youth access to vending machines.

• The tobacco industry is free to oppose any and all restrictions on self-service displays (otherwise known as "vending machines without glass and knobs").

• F2 (No opposition to inclusion of cigars in definition of tobacco products):

• Is this is a significant concession for the vast majority of jurisdictions, including Massachusetts, in light of the fact that it's being made by cigarette companies, not cigar manufacturers?

• F3 (No opposition to enhancement of enforcement efforts):

• The exact wording of this provision is troublesome in two respects:
  

• The industry can easily argue that this should be interpreted very narrowly to cover exactly what it says and no more: "Enhancement of enforcement efforts to identify and prosecute violations of laws prohibiting retail sales to Youth." (Emphasis supplied.) The industry would be free to oppose any other attempts to enhance enforcement efforts, including by the passage of a state look-back law or the passage of state or local laws for the licensing of tobacco retailers. These are among the most significant measures that could be enacted to limit youth access to tobacco

• The use of the word "prosecute" may provide an opening for the tobacco industry to argue that they have only agreed not to oppose enhancement of criminal enforcement efforts. In Massachusetts and many other jurisdictions, prohibitions on the sale of tobacco products to minors are enforced through less cumbersome civil and administrative procedures.

• F4 (No opposition to encouraging or using supporting technology for enhancement of enforcement):
  

• This is a significant concession for the vast majority of jurisdictions, including Massachusetts.

• F5 (No opposition to limitations on using tobacco products as prizes or give-aways in promotions of non-tobacco goods):
  

• Does this mean that the industry can oppose the use of tobacco products as prizes or give-aways in promotions of tobacco products? The answer is probably "yes."

• This is not a very significant concession, even if it is interpreted very broadly.

• F6 (No opposition to penalties on Youth for possession or use):
  

• The Massachusetts Coalition for a Healthy Future and many other tobacco control advocacy organizations oppose penalties on youth for possession or use.

• The biggest supporter of penalizing youth for tobacco possession or use is the tobacco industry!

• See Graham Kelder, The Perils, Promises and Pitfalls of Criminalizing Youth Possession of Tobacco (http://tobacco.neu.edu/tcu/YPFINAL.HTM).

• F7 (No opposition to limitations on tobacco product advertising in or on school facilities, or wearing of tobacco logo merchandise in or on school property):
  

• It is absolutely shameful that the tobacco industry would even dare to oppose such restrictions!

• This is not an issue that keeps tobacco control advocates awake at nights.

• F8 (No opposition to limitations bubble gum cigars, candy cigarettes, etc.):

• It is absolutely shameful that the tobacco industry would even dare to oppose such restrictions! Would an industry that allegedly doesn't target youths oppose such a restriction?

The Need To Seek Permission

• Section III m (2) prohibits lobbyists from supporting or opposing state, federal, or local laws or actions without authorization of the companies.
  

• So what? Such opposition can go forward after the lobbyists secure the necessary permission which the tobacco companies will be more than happy, I am sure, to supply.

V. Equitable (Non-monetary) Relief

By Patricia Davidson

Few significant non-monetary provisions are included in the proposed settlement. States willing to pursue a better deal for public health could achieve much more by either litigating their cases or holding out for a more comprehensive settlement. The alleged benefits of the proposed settlement can be achieved without agreeing to the loopholes and the giveaways.

Equitable relief, which is a court ordered remedy other than the payment of damages, could be crafted to achieve basic tobacco control policies. Court orders could (1) expressly prohibit wrongful tobacco industry conduct; (2) require corrective actions to remedy the harm of past industry conduct and (3) include prophylactic or "fencing-in" provisions designed to prevent a recurrence of industry violations of the law in the future.

• Enjoin Future Fraud. Court orders could, for example, expressly prohibit the industry from claiming that the link between smoking and disease has not been established and that tobacco products are not addictive. There is overwhelming evidence, much of which came to light as a result of the Attorneys General lawsuits, that the tobacco industry repeatedly made these false claims while their own internal research showed otherwise. An equitable decree could specify that certain kinds of false statements by the industry are prohibited.

• Correct Past Fraud. Correcting the deleterious effects of the decades of misleading industry statements and concealed research about smoking and health, addiction and targeting minors are among the most important goals the state Attorneys General cases could achieve. A court order could address these wrongful acts by requiring the tobacco industry to pay for a series of corrective advertisements.

• End Targeting of Minors. Many industry practices that target youth could be prohibited under a court order. For example, an equitable decree might ban all distribution of free samples, vending machine sales and self-service displays. Ending these industry practices, which promote illegal sales to minors, is a reasonable remedy to "fence-in" the rogue tobacco industry.

• Set Youth Smoking "Look-back" Penalties. One of the most glaring omissions in the proposed deal is the absence of any potentially effective mechanism to require the industry to actually reduce youth smoking. A court-ordered or settlement initiated "look-back" program could require tobacco companies to pay stiff penalties if specified targets for reducing youth smoking are not reached by certain dates. This novel type of order differs from those specifying or prohibiting certain types of industry conduct. Instead it attaches penalties to the effects (youth smoking rates) of industry action or inaction.

• Require Industry Payments for Targeted Cessation Programs. A court could order the industry to pay for withdrawal and cessation programs for tobacco users. The industry could be obliged to fund nicotine withdrawal programs as a way of mitigating future costs to the state treasuries. For decades the industry has carefully crafted and employed techniques to target specific populations (e.g., youth, communities of color, women). General and targeted withdrawal and cessation programs, along with targeted counter-advertising campaigns, could help reverse these effects.

• Order Industry Disclosures. Many incriminating industry documents have been released as a result of the Attorneys General lawsuits. However, there are probably many more, including, for example, documents regarding health effects of tobacco, nicotine manipulation, additives and marketing to minors, that have not yet surfaced. Continued litigation will provide key opportunities to employ the discovery process to uncover information the industry may still be hiding. Moreover, a court could order disclosure of industry research and data as an equitable remedy.

• Order Industry Funded Research. One of the key allegations in the Attorneys General complaints is that the industry promised to protect public health by undertaking research about tobacco use and sharing health information with the public. The industry’s past abuses in conducting biased research and failing to reveal its findings justify both the imposition of requirements to make good on that promise and restrictions on future research abuses.

• Disband Existing and Restrict Future Tobacco Industry Research Organizations. Dissolution of tobacco industry associations which have been used to promote fraudulent messages and withhold damaging research results, along with restrictions on future activities of reconstituted organizations, could be included in a court order.

 VI. Youth Access Provisions of the Master State Settlement

By Laura Hermer

The proposed master settlement raises a number of concerns, not as much for what it provides than for what it leaves out.

The proposed settlement:

• Omits any "lookback" provisions.

• Lookback provisions would provide participating manufacturers with a strong economic disincentive against marketing or otherwise encouraging the sale of tobacco products to minors.

• Such provisions would provide participating manufacturers with a true impetus to reduce youth sales.

• Lookback provisions are an essential component of any state settlement which is serious about reducing sales of tobacco products to minors.

• Omits any provisions preventing participating manufacturers from allowing their products to be used as part of a self-service display, requiring them to take strong active steps to prevent the use of their products in such displays, and making them liable for failure to take such steps.

• Self-service displays prevent sales clerks and other individuals from exercising an important aspect of control over tobacco products sales.

• Self-service displays are frequently located at child-level. They not only function as advertisements, but also as potential sources of items which children could take without anyone seeing.

• Provisions requiring participating manufacturers to take strong active steps to prevent the use of their products in self-service displays and penalizing them for any failure should be included in any acceptable state settlement with the tobacco industry.

• Omits any restrictions on participating manufacturers’ participation in point-of-sale advertising.

• The proposed settlement under consideration not only expressly permits point-of-sale advertising, but even allows tobacco products advertisements of up to fourteen feet square in size – veritable billboards - to be displayed inside or outside on the property of tobacco products retailers.

• In Massachusetts, a recent state study showed that stores located within 1,000 feet of schools – especially those located in minority neighborhoods - were more likely to display tobacco products advertisements than those located farther from schools.

• Many other studies have shown that children are particularly susceptible to certain tobacco products advertisements, and are influenced in their decision to begin smoking by tobacco products ads.

• Any state settlement serious about restricting youth use of tobacco products should include, at the very least, substantial restrictions on participating manufacturers’ ability to permit their advertisements to be used at the point-of-sale, if not an outright ban on that permission. Any permitted point-of-sale advertisements should be restricted to plainly informing adult consumers of the tobacco products brands available at the location and their prices, along with any required statements such as warnings and nicotine and tar contents.

• Omits any ban or other restrictions on the ability of participating manufacturers to operate or lease tobacco products vending machines, or to contract with operators or lessors of such vending machines.

• Numerous studies have shown that minors generally have substantial success in illegally purchasing tobacco products through vending machines.

• Only approximately half of all states have statewide restrictions on the siting of tobacco products vending machines.

• Any settlement which is serious about reducing youth access to tobacco products should include an outright ban on the ability of participating manufacturers to operate or lease tobacco products vending machines, or to contract with operators or lessors of such vending machines.

• In the alternative, an acceptable settlement should contain provisions which would require participating manufacturers to directly or indirectly restrict the sites where tobacco products vending machines may be located to establishments at which no one under the age of majority may enter.

The proposed settlement also:

• Requires participating manufacturers to either create or reaffirm its commitment to assist in the reduction of tobacco use by minors. Each participating manufacturer must designate an executive level manager to identify methods to reduce youth access to and consumption of tobacco products, and encourage the manufacturer’s employees to assist in this process.

• This provision is akin to letting a fox help design a security system for a henhouse.

• Prohibits participating manufacturers from providing gifts to minors based on proofs of purchase. It also stipulates that no participating manufacturer may provide any such gifts or cause such gifts to be provided without requiring the recipient to offer a driver’s license or other government-issued identification card (or legible photocopy thereof) as proof of age.

• This provision is less restrictive than the June 20^th settlement proposal, which would have entirely banned all offers of non-tobacco items based on proofs of purchase of tobacco products.

• It provides large loophole for youth access by permitting redemption of proofs of purchase for gifts by mail, even if the recipient must provide a photocopy of an identification card as proof of age.

• Bans participating manufacturers from distributing free samples of tobacco products or causing such distribution at any place other than an establishment or other restricted area in which the operator ensures (for instance by checking identification) that no person under the minimum age to purchase or possess tobacco products is present during the sampling.

• This provision does not go as far as the June 20^th settlement proposal, which would have banned free samples entirely.

• It is not included in any other state settlement to date.

• Prevents participating manufacturers from producing packs containing fewer than twenty cigarettes, or packages of loose tobacco containing fewer than 0.60 ounces of the substance. But this section only is in effect until the year 2001, after which the industry may apparently sell "kiddy" packs.

• The requirement to make youth possession and purchase of tobacco products illegal will make it more difficult for states to enforce bans on tobacco sales to minors laws because enforcement is through kids attempting to purchase tobacco at retail stores. Such attempts could be considered illegal under the terms imposed by this Agreement.

VII. Conclusion

The Master Settlement Text appears to be carefully drafted to provide the tobacco industry with many critical releases from current and future claims and local tobacco control efforts while providing shockingly little in terms public health benefits.  The payments to the states could be far less than advertised, and significantly less than is needed to treat the Medicaid population suffering from tobacco-induced disease.  The advertising and lobbying provisions would have very little impact .  The Agreement would require all settling states to criminalize rather than protect kids who do get hooked by the industry's seductive pitch and addictive products. Above all, the unprecedented manner in which the states have been given a five and a half day period to sign it or forget it is an unconscionable and anti-democratic way to force state governments to accept the industry's terms without adequate time for review.

All that glitters is not gold.